Deteriorating Conditions of Hosting Refugees: a Case Study of the Dadaab Complex in Kenya by IKANDA, Fred Nyongesa
Title Deteriorating Conditions of Hosting Refugees: a Case Study ofthe Dadaab Complex in Kenya
Author(s)IKANDA, Fred Nyongesa




Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Textversionpublisher
Kyoto University
29African Study Monographs, 29(1): 29-49, March 2008
Deteriorating ConDitions of Hosting refugees:  
a Case stuDy of tHe DaDaab CoMplex in Kenya
fred nyongesa iKanDa
Department of Social Sciences, Catholic University of Eastern Africa 
abstraCt  this study describes the deteriorating conditions of hosting refugees at three 
camps (ifo, Hagadera, and Dagahaley, popularly known as the Dadaab complex) that have 
been hosting refugees in the semi-arid northeastern part of Kenya since 1991. local people 
generally perceive refugees in negative terms for various reasons. first, they feel that refugees 
are more economically advantaged due to the assistance they receive from aid agencies and 
their ownership of various businesses at the three camps, which enables them to lead better 
lives. Competition for the scarce resources in the impoverished semi-arid area between the 
two groups has also fuelled the locals’ dislike for the refugees. socially, hosting fatigue has 
developed due to the protracted refugee situation at Dadaab, which is compounded by a large 
refugee population that is commonly associated with public insecurity. i conclude that in 
order to foster coexistence between the two groups, humanitarian agencies must incorporate 
locals more in direct aid programs such as provision of food rations, as well as reduce the 
high numbers of refugees in order to minimize insecurity and support the meager local 
resources.
Key Words: aid agencies; Dagahaley; economic factors; ifo; Hagadera; social factors; 
somali. 
introDuCtion
the refugee problem has continued to pose a major challenge to the united 
nations (un) since World War ii due to the constant escalation in refugee 
numbers in each passing decade. Consequently, the involvement of the un High 
Commissioner for refugees (unHCr) with refugees is becoming increasingly 
complex, especially in africa where the refugee crisis is perhaps the most 
chronic. While africans constitute only 12% of the global population, 47.5% 
of the world’s internally displaced persons are found in africa (Crisp, 2000a). 
Moreover, 43.9% of all officially registered refugees worldwide were on the 
african continent by the mid-1990s (unHCr, 1995).
as the refugee numbers continue to soar, refugee protection principles have 
increasingly been challenged and undermined around the world. from the 
1960s to the 1980s, for instance, refugees in africa were treated in a better 
way than in the period after 1990, when most african countries began to 
have a preference for repatriation at the earliest opportunity, regardless of the 
situations in the countries of origin (rutinwa, 1999). furthermore, tension and 
conflict between refugees and local residents has continued to be on the rise 
(Crisp, 2000a). thus, one of the greatest challenges facing the unHCr today is 
sensitizing local populations to the plight of refugees. 
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Various studies have attempted to investigate impacts of refugees or other 
displaced people on hosts in different contexts (Cernea, 2000; de Waal, 1988; 
Harrell-bond, 1986; Kuhlman, 1991; landau, 2004; salem-Murdock, 1989; 
Whitaker 2002). in this paper, i build on these studies and describe the factors 
that have influenced the rapid decline of the asylum institution at three closely 
situated camps in the northeastern part of Kenya. 
Kenya has experienced a huge influx of refugees from the Great Lakes 
region and the Horn of africa due to the relative peace and stability it has 
enjoyed since it attained independence. However, only four of the original 
17 refugee camps that unHCr had established in Kenya in the early 1990s 
remain operational: the Kakuma camp in the turkana District of northwestern 
Kenya and the three camps at Dadaab in the garissa District (ifo, Dagahaley, 
and Hagadera, commonly referred to as the Dadaab complex). this is mainly 
due to the government’s opposition to the refugee presence in Kenya, coupled 
with the increasingly negative perceptions toward refugees by the local hosting 
communities. these camps are located in semi-arid areas in northern Kenya 
and, as of early 2007, hosted over 241,000 refugees. Kakuma, with a majority 
of refugees from sudan, was set up in 1992 (ohta, 2005) and had a population 
of 69,400 by April 2007, according to a senior UNHCR official at the Nairobi 
branch office. Ifo was set up in 1991, and Hagadera and Dagahaley were 
established in 1992. 
Competition for meager resources in the impoverished semi-arid camp areas 
has contributed to the negative local attitudes toward the refugees (unHCr, 
2001a). Competition in business between refugees and locals, which reportedly 
led to the closure of the thika reception Centre for refugees in 1995 and the 
Jomvu camp at Mombasa (Verdirame, 1999; Crisp, 2000b), also negatively 
influences the local-refugee relationship at Dadaab. Despite the fact that 97% 
of the refugees at the Dadaab complex are from somalia (unHCr, 2001b) and 
have ethnic affinities with, for example, the Kenyan Somali, the similarities 
between them have not always been reflected in good commercial relations 
(Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). 
socially, the refugees at the Kenyan camps greatly outnumber the local 
population. the Dadaab complex had a population of 171,957 refugees by 
January 2007, consisting of 70,965 refugees at Hagadera, 60,386 at ifo, and 
40,606 at Dagahaley (figures provided by the UNHCR Branch office in 
nairobi). this population has continued to rise from the original 32,421 at ifo 
in 1991 and 38,123 and 41,245 at Dagahaley and Hagadera in 1992, respectively 
(unHCr, 1994), due to the long-drawn out civil war in somalia. for example, 
in June 2006, the islamic Courts union (iCu) militia (a loose group of both 
moderate and extreme islamists) defeated various warlords of somalia and took 
control of Mogadishu, but was in turn overthrown by somalia’s transitional 
federal government (tfg) forces backed by ethiopian troops in December 
2006 after a 2-week battle. This infighting led to an influx of about 34,000 
refugees across the Kenya-Somalia border in 2006 alone (figures provided by 
the UNHCR Branch office in Nairobi). This rise in refugee population occurred 
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despite repatriation efforts of small numbers of refugees from ethiopia, eritrea, 
sudan, uganda, and the Democratic republic of Congo, who also reside at the 
Dadaab complex. given a local population of around 15,000 (ikanda, 2004), 
the refugee numbers are more than ten times larger than those of their hosts 
at Dadaab. the government and hosting communities commonly blame this 
huge refugee presence for the rampant insecurity in northern Kenya (unHCr, 
2001b).
Compared to Dadaab, the refugee population at Kakuma has started to 
decrease due to voluntary repatriation of the sudanese refugees following 
the signing of a peace deal in January 2005 between the sudanese peoples’ 
liberation Movement/army (splM/a) and the sudanese government, who had 
previously engaged in a lengthy civil war that largely accounted for the current 
sudanese refugee problem. between December 2005 and april 2007, a total of 
4,613 Sudanese refugees have voluntarily been repatriated from Kakuma (figures 
provided by the UNHCR Nairobi branch office). 
Hosting fatigue due to the protracted situation of hosting refugees for over 
15 years is also evident at Dadaab. in addition, garissa has poor infrastructure 
due to the government’s neglect of the area. it is one of the poorest districts 
in Kenya, with absolute poverty standing at 68% (republic of Kenya, 2002). 
therefore, the poverty inherent around the camps has led the locals to perceive 
the refugees as enjoying higher standards of living due to the food aid and 
social services that are provided to them by aid agencies. 
However, the presence of refugees has led to improvements in infrastructure 
in these otherwise remote semi-arid areas. the local population buys foodstuffs 
from the refugee rations at a cheap price and has access to health care and 
education due to the presence of the humanitarian agencies. as a result, some 
researchers have argued that the refugee advantages outweigh their disadvantages 
(cf. Jamal, 2000). 
Here i describe the local-refugee relationship at the three refugee camps 
around Dadaab in relation to the above factors. the local somali(1) who inhabit 
the area around the camps and the refugees from somalia share the same 
language and religion due to their ethnic affinities. The Somali (refugees and 
their hosts) are a patrilineal group who are divided into clans, sub-clans, and 
lineages. inter-clan rivalries among somali refugees (which have been blamed 
for causing civil war in somalia), locals themselves, and between the former 
and the latter have also contributed to the declining hosting conditions at the 
Dadaab complex. the aim of this study was to document the impacts of a 
protracted hosting situation of a huge refugee population on an economically 
marginalized area and subsequently provide evidence to support the 
implementation of relevant interventions to improve the refugee-host relations in 
Kenya and beyond. 
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MetHoDology
i. outline of the Dadaab refugee Camp
the Dadaab complex is located in the garissa District of northeastern Kenya. 
the three camps at Dadaab are located within a radius of approximately 13 km 
from the Dadaab market (republic of Kenya, 2002), which is centrally placed. 
Due to semi-arid conditions that are unfavorable for agriculture and the lack 
of both infrastructure and major development initiatives, the local people are 
generally nomadic pastoralists. 
the refugee population comprises 35% of the district total (republic of 
Kenya, 2001). Despite being a semi-arid area, garissa has 385,500 ha of shrub 
bushes, of which 113,140 ha have been destroyed to meet the firewood and 
construction needs of both refugees and locals (republic of Kenya, 2002). 
according to the 1999 census, the district had a population of 392,510 local 
inhabitants.
ii. study Design and Data Collection Methods
this study was conducted among the local somali who resided in the imme-
diate vicinity of ifo, Dagahaley, and Hagadera between november 2002 and 
April 2003. Refugee leaders and agency officials were also interviewed as key 
informants. i also made shorter visits to the study site between 2004 and 2006 
to verify newly emerging information. Having lived side by side with refugees 
for over a decade, the respondents were generally conversant with the local-ref-
ugee relationship and the typical hosting circumstances at the Dadaab complex. 
they gave verbal informed consent for participating in the study.  
this was a cross-sectional study aimed at generating qualitative and 
quantitative data. a semi-structured questionnaire was administered to 150 locals 
(50 in the immediate vicinity of each camp), who were purposively sampled. 
the nomadic nature of the population generally discouraged random sampling. 
Two trained locals, fluent in the Somali language, assisted me in conducting 
these interviews and making translations. this was necessary because some 
respondents did not understand Swahili, which I spoke in the field. Therefore, 
both swahili and somali languages were used in collecting data for the study. 
Qualitative data were derived from key informant interviews and one focus 
group discussion (fgD) conducted in swahili. Key informant interviews were 
conducted on a sub-sample of 20 informants who had extensive knowledge on 
how refugees have been relating with their hosts since they were first settled 
around Dadaab in 1991. these included seven local leaders (two village elders, 
three chiefs, a district officer, and a liaison government officer), seven agency 
officials (distributed between UNHCR and its various implementing partners), 
and six refugee leaders (one block leader and one sectional leader from each 
of the three camps). one fgD of male opinion leaders was conducted to probe 
the issues that had emerged during the structured interviews. i moderated the 
33Deteriorating Conditions of Hosting refugees in Kenya
fgD, which was tape-recorded before being transcribed. observations of various 
public events and interactions between refugees and their hosts, together with 
informal discussions with security agents, refugees, and local residents, also 
contributed to the findings.
results
i. economic factors shaping local attitudes toward refugees
More than half of the respondents (n=81; representing 54.0%) perceived 
refugees to be better off economically compared to themselves, while only 69 
(46.0%) of the respondents thought they were better off economically than the 
refugees. 
Thirty-five (43.2%) of respondents who viewed refugees as being better off 
economically than locals thought this situation was a result of assistance in 
the form of food rations and other “free things” that refugees receive from 
humanitarian agencies. twenty others (24.7%) attributed the situation to the 
fact that refugees are more enterprising in business and work harder than the 
locals. a further 16 (19.8%) attributed the better economic status of refugees 
to the “dollars” that are remitted to them monthly by their relatives who have 
been considered for third country resettlement in rich Western countries. this 
money is usually transferred to refugee traders through somali companies called 
hawilad (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). the association of asylum with “dollars” 
in rich Western countries has stimulated “buufis” (i.e., the extreme hope to go 
for resettlement; Horst, 2001: 3) among both the refugees and the locals. this 
has led some locals to register as refugees in the hope of being considered 
for resettlement. locals also register as refugees in the hope of obtaining food 
rations and social services from the agencies (unHCr, 2001a). 
the locals’ desire to acquire refugee status is mainly due to the general 
poverty of the refugee camp areas, which, according to the results of this 
study, has forced some to subsist on less than $0.50 us per day. this is 
reflected in the respondents’ monthly incomes (Table 1); most (24.0%) said 
they were earning between 5,001 and 7,000 Kenya shillings (Ks)(2) from their 
economic activities, followed by 23.3% who were earning between 2,001 and 
3,000 Ks. in addition, 20.0% said they were earning between 3,001 and 5,000 
Ks, 16.7% earned above 7,001 Ks, and 10.7% earned below 1,000 Ks, while 
the remaining 5.3% earned from 1,001 to 2,000 Ks per month. the locals at 
Dadaab are poor in part because of the few economic opportunities available 
in the marginalized semi-arid area. persistent droughts that have led to loss of 
livestock have also contributed to the economic decline of the area (unHCr, 
2001b).
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table 1. Monthly income of locals
earnings per Month (Ks) frequency percentage
<1,000  16  10.7
1,001-2,000   8   5.3
2,001-3,000  35  23.3
3,001-5,000  30  20.0
5,001-7,000  36  24.0
≥7,001  25  16.7
total 150 100
Only five (6.2%) of the 81 respondents who viewed refugees as being better 
off economically than locals said that refugees enjoy a tax-free status that gives 
them an edge over the locals in business. The remaining five (6.2%) thought 
that the refugees were better off economically because they had the ability to 
obtain goods at cheaper prices through “haramu” (illegal and improper means) 
from somalia. i found that both locals and refugees pay a tax of 20 Ks to 
the garissa County Council for every animal sold or purchased at the camps, 
especially at Hagadera, which has the biggest animal and open air markets 
compared to those of ifo, Dagahaley, and Dadaab. refugees do not, therefore, 
enjoy a tax-free status at Dadaab except for those operating shops, restaurants, 
and other businesses inside the camps, which might explain the low percentage 
(6.2%) of the local respondents who cited this as a reason for the better 
economic position of refugees compared to locals. the conditions at Dadaab 
seem to be dissimilar to those that existed at the other closed Kenyan camps 
such as Jomvu in Mombasa, the closure of which was attributed to the unfair 
business competition between the locals and the refugees due to the tax-free 
status of the latter (Crisp, 2000b; Verdirame, 1999).
The findings also suggest that refugees are perceived to own more business 
enterprises than the locals. of the 150 local respondents, 96 (64.0%) said that 
refugees had more business enterprises, whereas only 46 (30.7%) were of the 
opinion that the locals owned more business enterprises than refugees. the 
remaining eight (5.3%) respondents argued that it depended on the specific 
group of refugees. the sudanese are considered by locals to be bad at business, 
while somali and ethiopian refugees are perceived to be better than the locals 
in business activities. 
the business activities that are practiced around Dadaab include trade in 
animals and animal products such as milk and hides, shops and restaurant 
businesses, trade in miraa (small leaves that are chewed as a drug or mild 
stimulant, also known as khat), selling new and second-hand clothes and 
shoes, and selling electronic goods such as radios and cameras. refugees 
dominate almost all of the above businesses except for the selling of milk 
and firewood, in which local businesses have the upper hand due to the fact 
that refugees have no free access to the vast bush resources around the camps 
where firewood and pasture for livestock are found. This is because refugees 
are officially not allowed to keep livestock, although many own goats whose 
pasture requirements are not as demanding as those of cattle or camels, which 
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are the main milk-producing animals in the area. Kenyan and agency officials 
usually turn a blind eye on the refugee ownership of livestock, although the 
refugee leaders stated that many locals are opposed to it and usually retaliate 
by confiscating the refugees’ goats or physically harming those looking after 
the animals or collecting firewood. Therefore, many refugees do not own cattle 
or camels except for a few who are engaged in livestock trade at the camps. 
locals also dominate the miraa business because refugees are not allowed to 
freely travel to Kenyan regions outside garissa where miraa is cultivated, due 
to the government’s policy of confining refugees in the camps. 
there are more business activities in the areas adjacent to the camps than at 
the Dadaab market due to the presence of cheap food rations that attract many 
locals to the camps. Because of the large volume of human traffic at the camps 
(consisting of both refugees and locals), many business activities that were 
previously carried out in Dadaab have now been transferred to the camps and 
the areas surrounding the camps, where market forces of supply and demand 
are in play. this means that locals who wish to purchase goods at lower prices 
must travel more than 10 km (from Dadaab, which is centrally located near the 
camps), which also appears to be creating tension between the two groups. the 
transfer of the animal market from Dadaab to the area adjacent to Hagadera, 
for instance, seems to have created dissatisfaction among local pastoralists. 
this is well captured in the sentiments of a local chief, a key informant, who 
argued, “the locals are currently refugees since they have to get everything, 
including the animals that traditionally belong to them, from the camps where 
refugees have become owners.”  there have also been numerous quarrels over 
access to the slaughterhouses in the camps between refugees and their hosts 
(Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). 
interestingly, the results also show that most local people (n=99; 66.0% of 
respondents) at Dadaab are not opposed to refugees running business enterprises 
in their area. only 35 (23.3%) of the respondents argued against allowing 
refugees to freely engage in business due to their refugee status, while the 
remaining 16 (10.7%) were undecided. 
Most respondents who supported the refugee engagement in trade (n=42; 
42.4%) argued that refugees participate in business out of necessity since they 
receive inadequate food rations. an additional 24 (24.2%) supported the refugee 
engagement in trade on the grounds that both refugees and locals are human 
beings who ought to be treated equally.  twenty others (20.2%) noted that the 
refugee presence had boosted the local economy and had led to a reduction in 
prices of goods and foodstuffs. this is because many refugees sell part of their 
food rations cheaply to the locals to buy clothes, shoes, milk, and other items 
that they lack. the remaining 13 (13.1%) of those in support of the idea that 
refugees should be allowed to own business enterprises opined that excluding 
refugees from business would lead them to engage in illegal activities, which 
would worsen the insecurity problem in the area.
Despite the many disadvantages cited by locals regarding the refugee 
presence, economic advantages were also acknowledged. some local key 
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informants pointed out that the growth of Dadaab as a trading center and a 
small town, and the improvement in infrastructure, were due to the presence of 
the refugee camps and the agencies’ efforts. participants in the fgD also agreed 
that locals have access to cheaper goods and foodstuffs because of the refugee 
presence, and that some locals had even attained the refugee ration cards that 
granted them access to free food and social services.
The economic advantages of refugees are also reflected in the fact that 
many locals regularly visit the camps mainly for economic reasons. of the 145 
(96.7%) respondents who said that they often visit the camps at Dadaab, 50 
(34.5%) indicated that they go there to sell or buy goods, while 31 (21.4%) go 
to work for the agencies or to try to secure such jobs. this demonstrates the 
importance of the three camps as major economic hubs of the area.
a number of locals even asserted that the refugees had taught them how to 
do business. One woman, when asked how she had benefited from the refugee 
presence, remarked: “i never thought that even a woman could engage in 
business and earn money the way i am doing.” similarly, many locals around 
Dadaab and the camps are now combining nomadic pastoralism with other 
economic activities such as engaging in business. This diversification provides 
locals with an alternative economic mode under circumstances of extreme 
famine. these reasons have prompted unHCr to argue that the net impact of 
refugees upon the regions they inhabit in Kenya is positive.
generally speaking, however, most locals were of the opinion that the refugee 
presence had opened pandora’s box regarding their current economic woes 
(which cannot be objectively true, as the area has always been marginalized, 
even long before refugees were settled there), and were hopeful that the 
repatriation of the refugees would come sooner rather than later.
II. Conflicts Arising Due to Competition for Scarce Resources 
Most locals (n=105; 70.0% of respondents) said that they were opposed to 
the idea of refugees being allowed to rear livestock at Dadaab, mainly due 
to the large refugee herds that have been competing with the locals’ livestock 
for pastures and the few water sources. only 32 respondents (21.3%) assented 
to the idea that refugees should be allowed to raise livestock. the remaining 
13 (8.7%) were undecided. The use of water sources and grazing fields are 
therefore a source of conflict that has significantly strained relations between 
the two groups due to the importance of livestock for the local pastoral nomads 
at Dadaab. 
According to a senior official at CARE International (a Canadian organization 
that is the main implementing agency for the unHCr) in Kenya, each refugee 
household owns an average of four goats. He said that although this was 
against the official policy, it seems inevitable since refugees direly need the 
goats’ milk. However, the refugees usually graze their livestock under common 
paid herders who are more familiar with the local terrain for ensuring the 
security of the animals, as they would easily be stolen by bandits if each 
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refugee household were to take care of its animals in isolation. this swells the 
refugee herds and arouses jealousy from locals who perceive refugees as having 
more animals, hence their opposition to the refugee ownership of livestock at 
Dadaab. 
both refugees and locals also use trees from the vast bushes in the area for 
construction and firewood needs. Although refugees are not prohibited from 
collecting firewood outside the camps, locals are entirely opposed to allowing 
refugees access to the bush resources, and usually employ various means of 
keeping refugees out of the bush. the refugee leaders who were interviewed 
as key informants stated that refugees fear going into the bush to look for 
firewood because locals assault them and confiscate the firewood or sometimes 
even rape women refugees in the bush. Most local informants, however, 
attributed the rape incidents to the shifta, i.e., the somali bandit groups that 
are widely perceived by both locals and the Kenyan government to reside in 
and around the vast shrub areas in northeastern province, but argued very 
emotionally against allowing refugees to use “their trees” for free. this is 
mainly due to the lucrative contracts of supplying firewood to the camps that 
are awarded to the locals by the agencies. 
UNHCR started a firewood project in which contracts are awarded (mostly 
to local bidders) to supply firewood to the three camps at Dadaab in a bid to 
reduce rape cases and firewood-related conflicts between refugees and their hosts 
(UNHCR, 2001b). Although the firewood supplied is inadequate to cater to all 
refugees’ needs, poorer locals meet the shortfall by selling firewood directly 
to the refugees at around 5 KS for every piece of firewood. Therefore, locals 
are vehemently opposed to allowing refugees to collect firewood from the bush 
since the firewood business is very profitable. This situation is similar to that 
at Kakuma, where locals have formed an association to enable them to conduct 
all tendering and bidding of firewood. If UNHCR fails to award the contracts 
to the locals as it sometimes does, violence usually erupts that sometimes leads 
to loss of life. for instance, in 2002, two young turkana(3) were shot dead at 
Kakuma in a firewood row pitting the UNHCR, locals, and refugees against 
one another (ikanda, 2004). 
The firewood contracts awarded to the locals by the UNHCR at Dadaab has 
appeased them to some extent, although the key local informants still felt that 
the big refugee population has continued to aggravate desertification in the 
area. one fgD discussant argued that the persistent droughts in the area can 
be attributed to the refugees’ negative environmental impacts, which has led to 
livestock loss and subsequent impoverishment of the local pastoralists. 
the harmful environmental impacts of both refugees and their hosts 
prompted the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (gtZ), a german 
organization that is the unHCr’s implementing partner on environmental 
conservation, to initiate forest restoration measures by dividing off and fencing 
various bush-depleted areas that have regeneration potential. these protected 
areas are popularly known as “greenbelts.” the largest greenbelt at Dadaab is 
approximately 6 ha, while the smallest covers an area of about 2 ha. presently, 
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most of the green zones around Dadaab are a result of the greenbelt initiative 
by the gtZ.
However, the greenbelt conservation project, despite its apparent good 
intentions, has not been well received by many locals, who see it as a far cry 
from what it was meant to accomplish. this is because the gtZ uses plant 
material from the bushes in the area to fence the greenbelts. from the local 
key informants’ perspective, it is illogical for the gtZ to cut the very trees that 
it is purporting to protect for the purpose of fencing off already depleted areas. 
in addition, some refugees have also fenced off areas that are similar to gtZ 
greenbelts where they do their own conservation for the purpose of grazing 
their livestock or selling foliage to fellow refugees and sometimes locals. some 
local key informants, in fact, interpreted the project as a scheme to grant 
refugees exclusive grazing rights in the greenbelts. therefore, the gtZ greenbelt 
project does not appear to have significantly changed the local perception that 
the destruction of their natural resources by the huge refugee population has 
made them poorer. 
as regards land issues, all 150 respondents unanimously agreed that refugees 
should never be allowed to own land. this must be understood in the light of 
the nomadic lifestyle of the locals, which entails communal ownership of land. 
at the moment, however, there seems to be a trend whereby privatization of 
land is slowly taking root. for instance, the areas occupied by the camps, the 
greenbelts, and even the business premises at Dadaab market are now private, 
not public, land. the focus group discussants and the local key informants also 
alleged that some wealthy refugees bought land at the Dadaab market after 
obtaining Kenyan identity cards from corrupt Kenyan officials. In addition, a 
small number of refugees cultivate millet and vegetables around the three camps 
through simple manual irrigation, which appears to have alarmed the locals into 
believing that their land is being taken away. although it is encouraging to 
make refugees self-reliant through such activities, it must be done with caution 
due to the nomadic way of life of the locals, whose grazing land is under 
common usufruct regimes where legal property rights are neither formalized nor 
individualized. 
the locals, whose movements were largely unrestricted before the advent 
of refugees, are no longer free to move or graze wherever they wish, at least 
not inside the camps, the greenbelts, or the small agricultural plots owned by 
refugees. the concept of private ownership that has slowly been introduced 
among people who did not know about it previously has therefore also 
generated negative local attitudes toward the refugees at Dadaab.
although competition for water sources between refugees and their hosts has 
prompted the agencies to sink water boreholes for both groups, the conflicts 
between the two groups have not been solved through this process. therefore, 
competition for scarce resources continues to be a major contributor of local-
refugee conflicts at Dadaab, especially due to the extreme poverty of both the 
locals and the majority of refugees.
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iii. social factors that Contribute to negative attitudes toward refugees
insecurity has been one of the major issues contributing to the negative 
perception of refugees at Dadaab. nearly all respondents (n=138, representing 
92.0%) attributed the insecurity in their region to the explosion in small arms 
across the porous Kenya-somalia border that coincided with the arrival of 
refugees. they argued that although insecurity had always been a problem in 
their area prior to the arrival of refugees due to the shifta menace, the onset 
of civil war in somalia in 1991 worsened the situation. the most common 
insecurity-related incidences at Dadaab are rape cases, cattle thefts, fights, and 
murder, which according to a local elder, have contributed to the economic 
decline of the area. This view reflects similar findings in neighboring Tanzania, 
where refugee-related insecurity has hindered expansion of agriculture (landau, 
2004). 
the Dadaab camps are widely believed to be hide-outs for criminals. the 
local key informants accused unHCr of overprotecting refugees even when 
they know that they commonly commit crimes. they alleged that refugees usu-
ally commit crimes such as theft, rape, and murder outside the camps before 
retreating into the safety of their camps where it is difficult for the police to 
trace them due to the large refugee population and the protection the refu-
gees receive from the unHCr, which manages the camps. a local chief, for 
instance, alleged that camps are safe havens for somali warlords who have 
families inside the camps, which they usually come to visit at night after fight-
ing during the day. 
Clan rivalries among the local somali have for a long period also contributed 
to the problem of insecurity in the larger garissa District. although most 
locals are of the ogadeni clan, other clans such as the Marehan and Harti 
are also present in significant numbers. There have been occasional inter-clan 
clashes among the locals over the use of natural resources. according to the 
unHCr (2001b), the ogadeni inter-clan rivalries that had been in existence 
before refugees came increased upon the arrival of other clans and sub-clans, 
who brought a history of inter-clan rivalries from somalia to the area and the 
refugee camps. If two clans fight in Somalia or elsewhere in Kenya, tension 
usually builds up between members of the same clans at refugee camps, and 
even with locals (unHCr, 2001b).
the protracted refugee situation at Dadaab also seems to have caused hosting 
fatigue among the locals, whose leaders constantly call for the repatriation of 
refugees through the Kenyan media and other forums. for instance, one key 
informant called for the expulsion of refugees due to what he described as “public 
fatigue that has been occasioned by their staying here too long.” another key 
informant suggested that the locals’ only salvation was to hope for the eventual 
repatriation of the refugees. as he put it:
“We have been keeping quiet because we know that one day peace will 
be restored back in their home countries and then they will go. if anyone 
suggested that they are being settled permanently, all hostilities that we 
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have been suppressing will explode.” 
at Dadaab, all social ills, including what locals perceive to be deterioration 
in cultural norms, is blamed on refugees. some practices deemed by the locals 
to be immoral according to islam, such as mixed marriages, drinking alcohol, 
and playing loud music, which are now evident at Dadaab, are associated with 
the refugee presence. a local chief also said he was opposed to the introduction 
of churches for non-Muslim refugees and the “scanty” clothing worn by female 
agency workers and non-Muslim refugee women.  refugees were also blamed 
for the introduction of the HiV/aiDs pandemic at Dadaab. this idea was 
particularly dominant in the fgD, where a local village elder argued: “the 
refugees have polluted our culture and brought aiDs into our midst.” locals’ 
association of refugee presence with a breakdown in the traditional structure 
and increase in HiV/aiDs has also been reported in other hosting situations, 
such as western tanzania (Whitaker, 2002).
in examining the social effects of the refugee presence on hosts at the 
Dadaab complex, it cannot be assumed that the hosts perceive all refugees 
similarly. as in other contexts (see Whitaker, 2002) the origins of the various 
refugee populations at Dadaab determine how the locals interact with different 
refugee groups. the somali usually view people from other ethnic groups 
as being inferior to them (Horst, 2003), and despite the inter-clan rivalries, 
they appear to tolerate somali refugees better than those from the sudan and 
ethiopia whom they usually treat with open scorn. somali children (both 
refugees and locals), for instance, habitually utter a contemptuous “uf uf” sound, 
accompanied by holding their noses with their fingers, whenever a Sudanese 
refugee is passing by (an offensive suggestion that the sudanese smell bad) and 
refer to black non-somali as people of “nywele ngumu” (hard/tough hair). it is 
also not uncommon to see a somali wash a water tap that was previously used 
by a sudanese refugee before using it inside the camps. 
one of the most positive social aspects of the refugee presence is the 
massive interaction between the two groups. for instance, almost all respondents 
(n=145, representing 96.7%) noted that they regularly visit the camps; of these, 
40 (27.6%) go to visit relatives while 20 (13.8%) go for other socio-cultural 
reasons such as seeking female genital mutilation services.(4) there are also 
significant numbers of intermarriages between locals and Somali refugees, which 
have been important in minimizing tensions and hostilities between the two 
groups. Lastly, the locals have also directly and indirectly benefited from social 
services such as medical care and education provided by the agencies due to 
the refugee presence. However, the refugee-local relationship at Dadaab appears 
to be characterized by more negative than positive social factors.
IV. The Role of Aid Agencies in Fueling Conflicts between Refugees and Locals
Most (n=35, 43.2%) of the respondents who argued that refugees are better 
off economically compared to the locals attributed the situation to being 
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discriminated against by the aid agencies. according to them, these agencies 
only assist refugees despite the fact that the locals are just as vulnerable as the 
refugees, if not more so. 
the humanitarian agencies’ role as the major agents of development in 
areas adjacent to the Kenyan refugee camps is critical since the government 
has largely ignored the locals in these regions. there are ten humanitarian 
organizations currently working in Dadaab. Care plays the unHCr’s 
implementing role while the other organizations such as the gtZ have their 
own specialized functions. However, much of the agencies’ direct aid, such as 
providing food rations, social services, and third country resettlement to those 
in extreme danger of being persecuted at the Kenyan camps, is mainly directed 
towards refugees, while locals only benefit indirectly, e.g., by buying food 
rations cheaply from refugees. the situation is made worse by the fact that the 
refugees have not been integrated into local communities and must rely on the 
agencies for almost all of their needs since most cannot be self-reliant. the 
locals are therefore filled with envy every time they see the agencies address 
the basic needs of refugees, such as providing food rations. this was expressed 
by a focus group discussant, a local chief in his early fifties, who stated:
“the pain we have is that we see all the good things being given to the 
refugees while we get nothing. We have given these people (refugees) 
accommodation but we see them eat while we go hungry. We only benefit 
from the agencies through inhaling the dust created by their vehicles that 
we shall never ride in.”
in terms of employment, the agencies had only engaged 28 (18.7%) of the 
respondents, mostly in low cadre jobs such as security guards. Many local 
respondents (n=53; 35.3%) indicated that they earned their livelihood from 
small business activities such as selling miraa, milk, and hawking other goods, 
followed by pastoral nomadism (n=32; 21.3%). According to senior officials at 
the unHCr and its implementing partners such as Care, gtZ, and Médecins-
Sans-Frontières (Msf, also known as Doctors without borders, a belgian 
organization in charge of medical services at the Dadaab complex), nearly all 
available jobs at the agencies are usually given to incentive workers (volunteers 
who are paid small amounts of money as incentives), most of whom are 
refugees due to the unHCr’s policy of building capacity among them. for 
example, a senior CARE official in charge of educational programs pointed out 
that of the 400 teachers employed thus far at the three camps, only five were 
locals while the rest were refugees.
the low educational levels of locals also seem to be working against them 
in securing agency jobs. for example, 72 (48.0%) of the respondents had no 
formal education, 25 (16.7%) had attained full or partial secondary school level 
of education, 21 (14.0%) had completed or partly obtained primary education, 
20 (13.3%) had acquired madrasa education (basic islamic knowledge that 
teaches Muslims how to read and recite the Koran), and only 12 (8.0%) had 
attained a post-secondary level of education. 
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according to Montclos and Kagwanja (2000), the locals at Dadaab have 
previously held demonstrations and organized petitions in support of their 
case for having more jobs in the camps. this shows the locals’ dissatisfaction 
with the agencies in job allocation matters, in spite of their low educational 
standards. given that only 8.8% of the district’s population is engaged in wage 
employment (republic of Kenya, 2002), this issue is highly sensitive. 
the agencies’ role in social services delivery appears to have also provoked 
hostilities between refugees and their hosts. in terms of education, for instance, 
the three camps at Dadaab had a total of 16 primary schools (six at Hagadera, 
and five each at Ifo and Dagahaley) and one secondary school for each camp, 
while the local population in Dadaab and the areas surrounding the camps 
were served by only one primary and one secondary school. each camp also 
had three health centers and a hospital (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000), as 
opposed to the vast neighborhood, which had no visible health services. the 
average distance to a health facility over the entire district is 50 km (republic 
of Kenya, 2002). the local informants maintained that they could only access 
education and health facilities under the guise of being refugees, which has 
forced a number of them to register as refugees.
agencies have also caused tensions between refugees and their hosts through 
their selective maintenance of water boreholes. the scarcity of water in the 
semi-arid Dadaab region has prompted the agencies to sink some boreholes 
for the locals in addition to those sunk inside the camps for refugee use 
(unHCr has funded the construction of 32 boreholes within a 150 km radius 
around Dadaab, while Care has sunk 17 inside the three camps for refugee 
use, according to a senior official at UNHCR, Nairobi Branch office). These 
boreholes have been very useful to the local population, but they have not 
helped to reduce hostilities between refugees and locals. this is because the 
refugees’ boreholes inside the camps are maintained by the agencies, while 
locals are usually required to maintain their own boreholes. the locals, 
therefore, pay 2 Ks as a maintenance fee for every 20-l container of water 
they draw, which they complain is expensive. Many locals feel they are “buying 
water,” as they commonly asserted during interviews, instead of helping in the 
borehole maintenance. thus, although the sinking of boreholes for the locals 
was a noble idea, it has made the locals feel discriminated against, which has 
increased rather than reduced the resentment of refugees by the locals.  
therefore, despite the fact that the agencies have immensely contributed in direct 
and indirect improvement of the locals’ lives, their refugee-centric approach appears 
to have largely contributed to the negative perceptions toward hosting refugees at 
Dadaab, since the locals do not seem to dislike refugees per se. this attitude is 
reflected in the sentiments of a village elder, who stated:
“our problem here is not with the refugees, but with the ngos [non-
governmental organizations] dealing with refugees as they have completely 
neglected us even though we gave the refugees the land they are settled 
on. they exploit us in all forms, yet give nothing in return, so how do 
you expect us to feel when they assist only refugees?”
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At the time I was conducting fieldwork for this study, CARE appeared to 
have started addressing the locals’ concerns. for instance, it had initiated a 
program to specifically assist locals, known as the Local Assistance Program 
(lap), which is the equivalent of the refugee assistance program (rap) that 
has been addressing refugee needs. According to the CARE official in charge 
of the program, the objective of lap was to improve the living standards of 
the local people by promoting educational and sanitation standards, providing 
drinking water by drilling boreholes, helping in marketing local livestock 
products, and improving food security by promoting micro-irrigation agriculture. 
unfortunately, i could not evaluate the impacts of this project, as it was still in 
its initial stages.
CARE had also begun training the local population in various fields such as 
animal health and tailoring, and offered basic nursing courses for the traditional 
birth attendants through a local ngo called aspect Dadaab. this ngo was 
registered in 1998 by the local elite with the objective of demanding the locals’ 
incorporation into the assistance programs offered by the agencies. according to 
a senior official, the NGO has also liaised with the GTZ in creating awareness 
on environmental degradation and has been lobbying Care into drilling more 
boreholes for the local population. the focus group discussants agreed that this 
ngo represents the best practices for assisting locals.
perhaps the greatest contribution of the agencies has been their role 
in improving the infrastructure in the previously neglected camp areas. 
For instance, a generator supplies electricity to agency officials and some 
government offices, while the locals who have registered as refugees have 
access to refugee schools and hospitals. However, inadequate direct aid to the 
locals has continued the perception of this assistance as but a drop in the sea.
DisCussion
Various studies of the refugee-local relationship have suggested that refugees 
are generally considered more economically vulnerable than their hosts, who 
usually employ refugees in various capacities (cf. Kibreab, 1985; Whitaker, 
2002). i found that more than half of the respondents (n=81; 54.0%) felt 
that they were worse off economically than the refugees, suggesting that the 
circumstances at the Dadaab complex may be different. a similar situation is 
reflected at Kakuma, where some wealthy refugees employed local children 
as domestic servants while a number of turkana women hosts engaged in 
prostitution out of necessity (Montclos & Kagwanja 2000).
the socio-economic neglect of the area by the Kenyan government and 
its long-standing insecurity problem (due to inhabitants fighting over scarce 
resources) has its roots in a history of political struggles. the berlin treaty 
of 1885, which partitioned Africa, ignored the ethnic affinities of the various 
african people, including the somali, as boundaries were based on european 
interests. britain ruled Kenya and northern somalia, france controlled Djibouti, 
and italy occupied southern somalia. in its endeavor to create a “buffer zone” 
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with ethiopia and italian somaliland (now somalia), the british colonial 
administration redrew administrative boundaries within Kenya, which created 
the northern frontier District (nfD, now northeastern province) in 1909. the 
movement of the somali people was restricted to the nfD (Hyndman, 1996: 
163). no effort was made by the colonial government to either promote social 
or economic activities in the district or integrate it politically with the rest of 
Kenya.
the newly independent Kenyan state took up where the colonialists had 
left in maintaining the economic and social isolation of the somali people as 
reflected in the post-independence government’s official strategy that stated in 
part:
“… our problem is to decide how much priority we should give … less 
developed provinces. to make the economy … grow as fast as possible, 
development money should be invested where it will yield the largest 
increase in net output. this approach will clearly favor the development of 
areas having abundant natural resources, good land and rainfall, transport 
and power facilities and people receptive to and active in development.” 
(republic of Kenya, 1965: 46)
this policy served to marginalize the entire northern part of the country 
where the four remaining refugee camps are currently located. this is due 
to the fact that successive governments have completely ignored the region 
in terms of infrastructural development. the systematic discrimination against 
the Kenyan Somali provoked them to fight for inclusion in greater Somalia at 
Kenya’s independence in 1963, which prompted the government to retaliate by 
imposing restrictions on commerce and the nomadic movement of these people 
(unHCr, 2001b). 
This formal neglect and underdevelopment significantly accounts for the 
economic vulnerability of the locals at Dadaab. However, many locals blamed 
the aid agencies for their economic problems, since these organizations signified 
the only signs of development in the area’s history. for instance, the local 
perception that refugees are enjoying more privileges has led a number of 
them to register as refugees in the hope of acquiring food aid, third country 
resettlement, and other direct benefits that are currently only available to 
refugees.
Agency officials interviewed as key informants attributed their refugee-
centered approach to the fact that their mandate is to assist refugees, since 
Kenyans have their own government. this argument appears to contradict the 
unHCr’s policy of raising standards for both refugees and their hosts if the 
standards of the latter are unacceptably low (Harrell-bond, 1986; unHCr, 
1995). in tanzania, for instance, aid agencies initiated development projects 
in host communities to compensate locals for the burden of hosting refugees 
(Whitaker, 2002). therefore, the agencies need to fully involve hosting 
communities in direct aid programs at the Kenyan camps, since it is largely 
through their presence that the local desire for development has been awakened. 
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Competition for scarce resources plays a major role in determining the refugee-
local relationship in many refugee contexts. in most cases, the local impact of 
refugees does not necessarily become negative until a situation of scarce resources 
leads to intensified competition between refugees and hosts (de Waal, 1988; 
Kibreab, 1985; Whitaker, 2002). at Dadaab, such competition has been particularly 
intense due to the semi-aridity that has resulted in scarce natural resources. this 
is coupled with the huge refugee population that results in a high refugee-to-local 
ratio, which contradicts the unHCr’s recommendation that large camps of over 
20,000 people should be avoided (unHCr, 1998). the situation has further been 
aggravated by the ever-increasing refugee population at the Dadaab complex due to 
the continuing civil war in somalia. an incessant expansion of refugee shelters and 
a parallel displacement process of the locals from their prime grazing land have 
resulted. Cernea (2000) argued that poverty is intrinsic to displacement whenever 
there are no corrective measures, which may explain the claims of many locals that 
the refugee presence had done them more harm than good.
insecurity is a sensitive issue at Dadaab. according to Crisp (2000b), the 
problem of violence is epitomized by the Kakuma and Dadaab camps, where 
incidents involving death and serious injury take place on a daily basis, and 
outbreaks of violence and unrest occur without warning. both refugees and locals 
blame each other for this insecurity. for instance, refugee leaders interviewed as 
key informants pointed out that the bulk of the bandit group memberships is made 
up of locals since the area has always been volatile, long before the advent of 
refugees. shifta are criminal gangs, and it is therefore difficult to prove whether 
they are refugees or locals. Harrell-Bond (1986) has argued that it is not difficult 
for host governments to demonstrate that the refugee presence leads to higher rates 
of crime in situations where refugees are hosted in conditions of extreme poverty, 
regardless of whether this is true. Similarly, it is difficult to determine whether the 
insecurity at Dadaab is mainly due to the refugee presence as has been argued by 
the government and the locals or due to other factors such as those cited by the 
refugee leaders.
the linkage of terrorist-related activities to the refugee presence has put them 
in an even more precarious situation at Dadaab. both the Kenyan and the u.s. 
governments have long reported that lawless somalia is a safe haven for suspected 
al-Qaeda terrorists. Having suffered the consequences of terrorist attacks twice (the 
1998 u.s. embassy bombing in nairobi and the 2002 bombing of the paradise 
Hotel in Kikambala), whose suspects are believed to have escaped to somalia, the 
Kenyan government appears to link somali refugees with terrorism and has lately 
refused to grant asylum to more Somali refugees fleeing the civil war at home. This 
was clearly demonstrated by the government’s closure of its border with somalia 
on 3 January 2007, locking out between 4,000 and 7,000 asylum seekers in dire 
need of humanitarian assistance at the border town of Dobley in somalia, according 
to various civil society groups in somalia, out of its concern that terrorists would 
enter the country disguised as refugees. in brief, there is substantial intolerance 
toward refugees in Kenya as demonstrated by the fact that all refugee camps are 
found in the most unproductive parts of the country where refugees have not been 
integrated into the local economies.
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This notwithstanding, both the refugees and their hosts are benefiting from each 
other’s presence. for instance, various key informants told me that some refugees 
had become Kenyan citizens fraudulently by “buying” Kenyan identity cards from 
corrupt officials. On the other hand, some locals at Dadaab have also acquired 
refugee ration cards, which are sold discreetly at the markets set up in the camps 
for about 2,000 Ks (Hyndman, 1996). in fact, a number of somali from both 
sides of the border have “dual status” whereby they hold both Kenyan and somali 
identifications at once (Hyndman, 1996: 269). This arrangement entitles the locals 
to food rations and social services provided to the refugees and greater mobility 
and sometimes the opportunity to work in Kenya for the refugees. thus, this “grey” 
economy shows that their continued co-existence is in the best interest of both 
groups. the refugees should therefore not only be viewed in terms of disadvantages, 
but also in terms of their relative advantages for local communities (Harrell-bond, 
1986; Whitaker, 2002). 
ConClusions
the study established that the institution of asylum has seriously deteriorated 
in Kenya due to various factors. socially, the insecurity associated with the 
refugees, the general poverty of the locals that makes them perceive refugees as 
leading better social lives, and the protracted refugee situation that has resulted 
in hosting fatigue have all contributed to the locals’ negative perception of 
the refugees. Competition for the meager natural resources at Dadaab has also 
played a key role in influencing the negative local perception of the refugees.
the perception that refugees are better off economically than their hosts 
also appears to have contributed to the deteriorating attitudes of locals toward 
refugees. Most sentiments expressed by locals pertaining to the “better” 
economic status of refugees are actually inaccurate. the reality at Dadaab is 
that the majority of the refugees are generally poor since only a tiny percentage 
of refugees are entrepreneurs. this is illustrated by the sentiments of a somali 
refugee leader who argued that it is actually the refugees’ deprivation that has 
made their children malnourished and has often forced them to put their lives 
at risk by venturing into the shifta-occupied forests to look for firewood and 
construction poles. in addition, the fact that some refugees at Dadaab have 
fraudulently acquired Kenyan identity cards and others are still striving to 
obtain them clearly demonstrates the fact that the refugees at Dadaab are not 
satisfied with their status.
Competition in business, although important, appears to be insignificant in 
shaping local attitudes toward refugees at Dadaab, as most locals (n=99; 66.0%) 
were not opposed to refugee engagement in trade. this is contrary to other 
studies (cf. Crisp, 2000b; Verdirame, 1999) that attributed the closure of former 
refugee camps in Kenya to hostilities between locals and refugees due to com-
petition in business. this appears to be a paradox since locals are not opposed 
to one of the sources of the refugee wealth (trade), yet they perceive them neg-
atively for allegedly being richer. However, this ambivalence is not surprising, 
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as the local reason for perceiving refugees negatively as argued by a local elder 
is the feeling that aid agencies, not the refugees per se, were discriminating 
against the locals. 
although the agencies have helped in improving local living standards in 
terms of improving infrastructure, sinking boreholes, and providing social 
services such as medical care, the hosting community at Dadaab appears to 
have increasingly felt discriminated against since they are not given food rations 
and other direct benefits that are currently being enjoyed by refugees. Previous 
studies, notably by Harrell-bond (1986), have advocated raising standards for 
both refugees and their hosts in refugee hosting situations. in addition, the “refugee 
aid and development” strategy (unHCr, 1995: 158) also emphasizes the need 
to develop refugee-populated areas.  therefore, the aid agencies at Dadaab 
should incorporate locals more into their aid programs, by providing them with 
occasional food aid, strengthening the lap and local ngos such as aspect 
Dadaab, and helping to maintain the local boreholes to remove the perception 
of locals that they are buying water. 
in addition, the Kenyan government should meet its responsibility to improve 
the socio-economic infrastructure of the northern region where the Kakuma 
camp and the Dadaab complex are located. the government should also view 
refugees not only as a problem, but also as an opportunity, since refugees have 
made a very positive contribution to the local economy in terms of providing 
a market for local animals, promoting trade, and attracting agency aid. given 
the realities of the protracted refugee situation in Kenya, the government should 
cooperate with the aid agencies to fully integrate refugees in Kenya instead of 
confining them into camps. 
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notes
1. the local residents in the garissa District are of the somali ethnic group. since most 
refugees from somalia also belong to the somali ethnic group and the word “somali” 
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may refer to either a nationality or an ethnic group, i use the word “locals” to refer to 
Kenyan nationals who belong to the somali ethnic group.
2. the exchange rate for the Kenyan shilling varied between 75 and 80 to $1 us from 
november 2002 to april 2003 when the study was being conducted.
3. the turkana are a nilotic ethnic group who are the refugee hosting community at 
the Kakuma camp in the vast turkana district in the rift Valley province of northern 
Kenya. 
4. female genital mutilation is performed as a cultural rite among various somali groups. 
it is illegal in Kenya, but some local women secretly take their daughters to undergo 
the rite inside the camps where they are less likely to be detected due to the weak polic-
ing of the huge refugee population.
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